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Case Note
PROPERTY LAW—Once a Road, Always a Road?:
How the Wyoming Supreme Court is Leaving Rural Landowners
in Limbo; King v. Board of County Commissioners of Fremont,
244 P.3d 473 (Wyo. 2010)
Kelianne Chamberlain*
Introduction
The Wyoming Supreme Court’s holding in King v. Board of County Com
missioners of Fremont dealt a significant blow to rural landowners seeking certainty
in their land title.1 Over eighty years after the Fremont County Board of County
Commissioners (Commission) improperly established “Bunker Road,” Edward
and Janice King purchased property without actual or constructive notice of the
road easement crossing their land.2 When the Kings finally learned about the
Bunker Road easement, they unsuccessfully sought a ruling from the Commission
vacating the road.3 The Kings then sought a declaration from the district court
that because Bunker Road had never been properly recorded, it was never actually
created.4 On summary judgment, the district court held the Commission properly
established Bunker Road and dismissed the remaining issues based on Wyoming
case law.5 The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed.6
This note argues the Wyoming Supreme Court improperly decided King.7
First, the court applied incorrect law in determining Bunker Road was properly

* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming College of Law, 2014. I would like to thank
my husband, Judd Chamberlain, and my daughters, Dani and Leila, for their support, patience,
and welcome diversions throughout this writing process. I would also like to thank Alan Romero
and the editors of the Wyoming Law Review for kindly addressing my endless questions. Finally, I
would like to thank the practitioners and other professionals who granted me interviews and offered
their insights.
1

King v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Fremont (King), 244 P.3d 473, 489 (Wyo. 2010).

2

Id. at 475–76.

3

Id. at 474, 488.

4

Id. at 474.

King v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Fremont, No. 34662, 2008 WL 7727322, at ¶ 8 (Wyo.
Dist. Ct., 9th Jud. Dist., Fremont Cnty. Apr. 22, 2008) (Order Denying Plaintiffs’ and Intervening
Plaintiff ’s Motion for Summary Judgment in Part and Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment in Part); King v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Fremont, No. 34662, 2009 WL 6364902, at
*2–3 (Wyo. Dist. Ct., 9th Jud. Dist., Fremont Cnty. Sept. 11, 2009) (Order Granting Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss) (collectively King I ).
5

6

King, 244 P.3d at 489.

7

See infra notes 139–223 and accompanying text.
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created.8 Second, the court relied on faulty, distinguishable precedent to dispose of
the remaining issues in the case.9 Third, in addition to being legally unfounded, the
King decision results in poor policy by leaving rural landowners with uncertainty
as to the quality of their title regarding the existence of county roads.10 In order
to remedy this uncertainty rural landowners now face, the Wyoming Legislature
should reinstate protections for bona fide purchasers and should modify the
existing road identification procedure.11

Background
Creation and Maintenance of County Roads
“The establishment of a highway must be in a mode recognized in the
jurisdiction involved, otherwise a public highway is not created.”12 In 1913,
section 2514 of Wyoming’s Compiled Statutes placed all county roads “under
the supervision, management and control of the board of county commissioners
of the county wherein such roads are located.”13 According to the statute, no
county road could be established, altered, or vacated except by the authority of
the respective board of county commissioners.14 Therefore, “once shown to exist,
[a highway] continues to exist.”15 However, a county road is not shown to exist
when there is a defect in the proceedings that prejudices a party.16 Additionally, a
county road can be abandoned.17 In Wyoming, the procedure for abandonment is

8

See infra notes 144–65 and accompanying text.

9

See infra notes 166–94 and accompanying text.

Telephone Interview with Keith Dodson, Williams, Porter, Day & Neville PC (July 11,
2012) (noting that the burden of a county road encumbrance shifts from title insurers to land
owners); Interview with Alan Frank, GIS Director, Albany County, Wyoming, in Laramie, Wyo.
(August 2, 2012) (stating the county doesn’t know whether county roads are county roads anymore);
Interview with Steven F. Freudenthal, Partner, Freudenthal & Bonds, PC, in Cheyenne, Wyo. (July
10, 2012) (noting that attorneys “cannot give clients any certainty” regarding county roads on their
property); Interview with M. Gregory Weisz, Partner, Pence and MacMillan, LLC, in Laramie,
Wyo. (July 12, 2012) (explaining that title insurers will now likely exempt coverage for county roads
by redefining what constitutes “public record” that they must search); see infra notes 195–204 and
accompanying text.
10

11

See infra notes 209–23 and accompanying text.

12

39A C.J.S. Highways § 4 (2012).

13

Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 2514 (1910).

14

Id.

King, 244 P.3d 473, 489 (Wyo. 2010) (stating the maxim as, “once a road, always a road”);
39A C.J.S. Highways § 128 (2012).
15

16

39A C.J.S. Highways § 80 (2012).

17

Id. § 128.
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set by statute and can only be implemented through the formal acts of the board
of county commissioners.18

Creation of a County Road Requires Recording
The policy of a recording statute is “to protect those who record first [and] to
establish certainty in records.”19 Ultimately, if a recording law requires recordation
in a certain manner, an instrument is generally deemed unrecorded until it follows
the prescribed procedure.20 For example, when the Commission created Bunker
Road in 1913, it was required to obtain an accurate survey and to record that
survey along with an official plat map with the county clerk in order for the road
to be “easily ascertained.”21
Further, in 1919, the Wyoming Legislature passed a statute requiring
recordation of all existing roads by 1921.22
It shall be the duty of the several Boards of County Commis
sioners, within their respective counties, prior to said date, to
determine what if any such roads now or heretofore travelled but
not heretofore officially established and recorded, are necessary
or important for the public use as permanent roads, and to cause
such roads to be recorded . . . and all roads recorded as aforesaid,
shall be highways. No other roads shall be highways unless and
until lawfully established as such by official authority.23
This Act provided that no road would be a public road unless officially established
and recorded and that any existing road not recorded by the stated deadline of
January 1, 1922 (later amended to January 1, 1924) would be vacated.24 The
Wyoming Supreme Court stated, “We do not see how any language [of the Act]
could be plainer.”25

See id.; Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 2514 (1910) (current version at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-1-104
(2012)) (“[N]o county road shall hereafter be established, altered, or vacated . . . except by authority
of the board of the county commissioners.”).
18

Condos v. Trapp, 717 P.2d 827, 831–32 (Wyo. 1986) (noting “a grantee should seasonably
record . . . in order to effectuate this purpose”); accord First Interstate Bank of Sheridan v. First Wyo.
Bank, N.A. Sheridan, 762 P.2d 379, 383 (Wyo. 1988).
19

20

66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and Recording Laws § 101 (2012).

See Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 2531 (1910). The Commission was required to record the
information “in books to be provided by the county for such purpose.” Id.
21

22

1919 Wyo. Sess. Laws 144 (current amended version at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-1-101 (2012)).

23

Id.

1921 Wyo. Sess. Laws 139; 1919 Wyo. Sess. Laws 144; Yeager v. Forbes, 78 P.3d 241, 255
(Wyo. 2003).
24

25

Nixon v. Edwards, 264 P.2d 287, 291 (Wyo. 1953).
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Wyoming’s legislative history further evidences the legislature’s intent to
require recording for the creation of county roads.26 In 1877—before Wyoming
became a state—the territorial legislature “inaugurated a policy to cause the rural
public roads in this commonwealth to be spread upon the public records.”27
At the same time, the legislature required the county commissioners to make
public an adequate description of the road.28 In 1895, the Wyoming Legislature
attempted to “enact a complete code relating to rural public highways” and
required recording “without unnecessary delay.”29
Additionally, a long line of Wyoming cases supports the contention that a
road must be recorded.30 If controlling precedent exists in the jurisdiction, a state
court has little reason to look to other courts for persuasive authority.31 In Kern
v. Deerwood Ranch, the Wyoming Supreme Court explained that statutes require

Id. at 289 (“[C]ommencing with at least the legislative act of 1886, . . . the legislature
adopted a general policy under which . . . all rural public thoroughfares thereafter established should
be shown on the records of the public authorities.”).
26

Id.; 1877 Laws of Wyoming, “Wagon Roads,” § 1, at 135 (“That the board of county
commissioners [sic] of the several counties of the Territory of Wyoming shall have power to adopt,
and by resolution entered of record, appropriate to county and public uses any road or route publicly
traveled, within their respective counties.”). Wyoming became a state in 1890. Statehood, State of
Wyoming, http://wyoming.gov/history.aspx#state (last visited July 12, 2012).
27

28
1877 Laws of Wyoming, “Wagon Roads,” § 2, at 135 (requiring “the several boards of
county commissioners to keep a record of all such proceedings, and a profile or other sufficiently
accurate description of the road so made public, for the information of the public, as to the precise
road or route so appropriated to county and public use, which record shall always be open to
inspection by the public”).
29
Nixon, 264 P.2d at 290; 1895 Wyo. Sess. Laws 126 (titled “An Act to revise, amend and
consolidate the Statutes relating to Highways and Bridges.”); 1895 Wyo. Sess. Laws 128. The
Wyoming Legislature stated:

If, upon considering and acting upon the report of the viewer, or otherwise, the
Board of the County Commissioners shall decide to lay out said road, they shall cause
the county surveyor to make an accurate survey thereof, if such survey is deemed
necessary, and to plat and record the same in the book provided by the county for such
purpose; and a copy of said plat and notes of survey shall, without unnecessary delay,
be filed in the office of the county clerk.
Id.
See Kern v. Deerwood Ranch, 528 P.2d 910, 911–12 (Wyo. 1974) (holding that defendants
failed in their burden to prove the existence of a county road because they could not show the road
survey and plat were filed with the county clerk); Ruby v. Shuett, 360 P.2d 170, 174 (Wyo. 1961)
(holding that establishment of a county road failed because the survey filed was not sufficiently clear
as to the location of the road); Rocky Mtn. Sheep Co. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Carbon Cnty.,
269 P.2d 314, 318 (Wyo. 1954) (explaining that recording of a new road is required in order to be
certain and definite as to which roads are county roads); Nixon, 264 P.2d at 288, 292–94; George W.
Condon Co. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Natrona Cnty., 103 P.2d 401, 407 (Wyo. 1940) (noting an
unrecorded road was not a county road, and therefore it was improper for the county to construct
or maintain the road).
30

31

See 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 143 (2012).
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road surveys, plats, and notes to be filed with the county clerk in order for county
commissioners to legally establish a road.32 Accordingly, the Kern court noted that
failure to record a road plat and survey results in a failure to establish a county
road.33 Similarly, in Nixon v. Edwards, the court held a road could only be made
a county road by formal establishment—including recordation.34 The court in
Rocky Mountain Sheep Co. v. Board of County Commissioners of Carbon County
stated that “establishment by the county commissioners of a public road must
be made of record, in order that it be made certain and definite as to what are
public roads.”35
In Colorado, a failure to strictly comply with a recording statute does not
void the creation of a road.36 In Lakewood v. Mavromatis, the Colorado Supreme
Court held that even though Colorado’s legislature intended for public roads to be
recorded in compliance with Colorado’s recording act, the county commissioners’
failure to fully record the easement was not detrimental to the existence of a
road.37 The court stated, “[t]he evident purpose of the [road] statute is to give
notice of the establishment of the road but it [does] not follow that recording with
the recorder of deeds was necessary to the establishment of the public highway.”38
However, many nearby and neighboring states do require recording to establish
a road.39 These neighboring statutes are consistent with the policy evident in

32

528 P.2d at 911.

33

Id.

264 P.2d at 288, 292–94. The court here was distinguishing formal establishment from
acquiring a road by prescription. See id.
34

35
269 P.2d 314, 318 (Wyo. 1954) (noting a road was not a county road because the records
“fell far short of meeting the requirements of [the recording] statute”).
36

See Lakewood v. Mavromatis, 817 P.2d 90, 93 (Colo. 1991).

Id. In Mavromatis, the road petition was filed in a road book with the county clerk, but the
road was never entered into the grantor-grantee indices. Id. at 92.
37

38

Id. at 97 (quoting Bd. of Comm’rs of Weld Cnty. v. Ingram, 73 P. 37, 37 (Colo. 1903)).

See Cal. Sts. & High. Code § 948 (2012) (explaining that “proper evidences of title to
every right-of-way, and all incidents thereto” regarding county highways must be recorded with
the county recorder); Idaho Code Ann. § 40-202 (2011) (noting that documents establishing a
property interest for highway system purposes must be recorded in the county records); Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 19-310 (2012) (noting that the county clerk must keep the report of the commissioners, a
survey, and maps “in regard to laying out and establishing roads in the county”); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 39-1710 (2008) (requiring “the county board [to] cause the plat of [a newly established road]
to be recorded and platted in the road plat record of the county with a proper reference to the
files in the office of the county clerk where the papers relating to the same may be found”); N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 67-5-16 (2009) (“If the board of county commissioners determine to open any such
road, they shall cause the full and final report . . . to be recorded in the office of the county clerk
and recorded, in a book kept for that purpose.”); Or. Rev. Stat. § 368.106 (2012) (requiring any
county governing body to record documents establishing an interest in real property for public road
purposes); Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-107 (2010) (“The plats and specific descriptions [of all county
roads] shall be kept on file in the office of the county clerk or recorder.”).
39
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Wyoming’s legislative history, as well as current statutes and case law, requiring
recording for the creation of a road.40

An Unrecorded Interest Does Not Burden a Subsequent Good-Faith Purchaser
Generally, a party who diligently searches records of real property is
entitled to rely on those records.41 Recording statutes protect purchasers who
diligently search title records and have no notice of a prior interest in the land.42
Correspondingly, in 1913, the law in Wyoming rendered unrecorded interests
void against subsequent good faith purchasers who recorded first.43 However,
“[e]ach and every deed, mortgage, instrument or conveyance touching any interest
in lands, made and recorded according to the provisions of law, [was considered]
notice to . . . any subsequent purchaser.”44 A good faith or “bona fide” purchaser
is a party who purchases property with “no actual, constructive or inquiry notice
of any . . . infirmities in the title.”45 Actual notice comes from actual knowledge

40

See supra notes 21–39 and accompanying text.

1 Joyce Palomar, Patton and Palomar on Land Titles §§ 4, 12, at 14, 57–58
(3d ed. 2002); 66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and Recording Laws § 72 (2012); see C. Dent Bostick,
Land Title Registration: An English Solution to an American Problem, 63 Ind. L.J. 55, 60 (1988)
(“Presently, inquiry is concerned with evidence of title obtained through recordations, actual notice,
or possession.”).
41

42
N. Am. Uranium, Inc. v. Johnston, 316 P.2d 325, 343 (Wyo. 1957) (explaining that an
unrecorded instrument is effective between the parties but not against a subsequent purchaser
without notice); 66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and Recording Laws § 71 (2012); see Owen L. Anderson,
The Growing Uncertainty of Real Estate Titles, 65 N.D. L. Rev. 1, 45 (1989) (explaining that the
primary purpose of race-notice systems is “to protect the investment of a prospective, innocent
purchaser”); Ashley Harrell, Mortgage Rescue Fraud and the Subsequent Purchaser, 64 Consumer
Fin. L.Q. Rep. 387, 391 (2010) (“If the parties to private transactions cannot rely on the public
recording system as evidence of ownership . . . then even the most routine transactions cannot be
prudently conducted.”).
43
See Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 3654 (1910). The statute provides, “[e]very conveyance of real
estate . . . which shall not be recorded as required by law, shall be void, as against any subsequent
purchaser or purchasers in good faith.” Id. The Meeker court construed this language as excluding
interests acquired by condemnation. See State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Meeker, 294 P.2d
603, 604 (Wyo. 1956). However, Wyoming statutes include within the definition “any estate or
interest in real estate . . . by which the title to any real estate may be affected in law or in equity.”
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-102 (2012).
44
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 3653 (1910) (emphasis added). Recording requirements remain
substantially the same today. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-120 to -121 (2012); Grose v. Sauvageau,
942 P.2d 398, 403 (Wyo. 1997) (“Public policy requires that subsequent purchasers be able to
rely on the title shown in public records.”); Condos v. Trapp, 717 P.2d 827, 832 (Wyo. 1986)
(“[A] subsequent deed, recorded first, is given priority over the prior deed to the same property
recorded last.”); Torgeson v. Connelly, 348 P.2d 63, 66 (Wyo. 1959) (“[E]very conveyance not
recorded as required by law is void as against a subsequent purchaser in good faith for valuable
consideration whose conveyance is first duly recorded.”).
45
Bentley v. Dir. of Office of State Lands and Invs., 160 P.3d 1109, 1120 (Wyo. 2007) (citing
Grose, 942 P.2d at 402).
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of an infirmity.46 Constructive notice means a subsequent purchaser is deemed by
law to have notice of any interests in land that are properly recorded.47 A party
is charged with constructive notice whether or not the purchaser has actually
seen the record, because a purchaser is expected to search the record for properly
recorded interests.48 Inquiry notice is triggered when an ordinary inspection
would have revealed the title defect.49
In many jurisdictions, a document is “not deemed filed . . . if withdrawn from
its proper place among the files” or if filed in an improper book.50 Maintaining files
in the correct location “is fundamental to the scheme of providing a constructive
notice through the records.”51 Accordingly, in Torgeson v. Connelly, the Wyoming
Palomar, supra note 41, § 12, at 58–60; 58 Am. Jur. 2d Notice § 4 (2012) (defining actual
notice as “notice expressly and actually given”); Emily Bayer-Pacht, The Computerization of Land
Records: How Advances in Recording Systems Affect the Rationale Behind Some Existing Chain of Title
Doctrine, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 337, 344–45 (2010); Harrell, supra note 42, at 392 (“Actual notice
arises where one is personally aware of a conflicting interest in real property.”).
46

See Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of Steamboat Springs, N.A., 144
P.3d 1224, 1229 (Wyo. 2006); 58 Am. Jur. 2d Notice § 4 (2012) (defining constructive notice as
information imputed by law to a person who has the duty to inquire into it and who could have
discovered it with proper diligence); Tanya D. Marsh, The Limits of Constructive Notice: A Call to
Reform Indiana’s Recording Statutes, Res Gestae, Oct. 2002, at 20 (noting that in a “race-notice”
system, recorded and indexed documents are “valid and effectual” at the time of recording).
47

Palomar, supra note 41, § 12, at 61–62; 58 Am. Jur. 2d Notice § 4 (2012) (“[G]ood
faith failure to seek out the ultimate facts constitutes no defense.”); 66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and
Recording Laws § 78 (2012) (noting that it is the duty of a subsequent purchaser to examine the
record in order to “know or take notice of the condition of the record title up to the time of
creating the encumbrance or making the sale”); Bayer-Pacht, supra note 46, at 345 (“[S]ubsequent
purchasers have constructive notice of all properly recorded deeds in their chains of title if they
could have discovered them by conducting a reasonable title search, regardless of whether they
actually discovered them.”).
48

49
Grose, 942 P.2d at 403 (“Inquiry notice is based on the premise that the failure to make
inquiry by someone with sufficient knowledge to create a duty to do so will be attributed to their
[sic] own negligence.”); Palomar, supra note 41, § 12, at 70; Harrell, supra note 42, at 392 (“[I]f
a subsequent purchaser at the time of conveyance had knowledge of circumstances indicating that
another party might have an unrecorded interest, that purchaser is deemed to have constructive
notice of any prior interest that would have been discovered upon a reasonable investigation.”).
50
66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and Recording Laws § 74 (2012); accord Palomar, supra note 41,
§ 66, at 222 (“[T]he general rule is that there is no valid record, and therefore no constructive
notice, unless the record is in the proper book.”); 66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and Recording Laws § 63
(2012) (“An instrument that is not recorded in the book in which such instruments are customarily
recorded is not properly recorded . . . .”); 66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and Recording Laws § 101 (2012)
(“[A]n instrument is deemed not recorded as prescribed by law until it has been transcribed into
the proper book. The policy of the law in this respect is to afford facilities for intending purchasers
or mortgagees of land in examining the records for the purpose of ascertaining whether there are
any claims against it. If recorded in a different book from the one directed, it is to be regarded as
if not recorded at all.”); Marsh, supra note 47, at 22 (“The ‘modern trend’ is to treat mis-indexed
instruments as unrecorded for purposes of establishing priority and/or putting bona fide purchasers
on notice.”).
51

66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and Recording Laws § 101 (2012).
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Supreme Court noted, “Wyoming legislative provisions are definite that the filing
or leaving of a conveyance in any office other than that of the register of deeds
cannot constitute constructive notice.”52
Furthermore, the court has held that recording errors will not be charged
against subsequent good faith purchasers.53 Even in Mavromatis, Colorado’s
Supreme Court held that a failure to comply with the recording statute would not
affect the creation of a road, but it would affect notice for subsequent purchasers.54
Accordingly, the Mavromatis court held in favor of the landowners because they had
no notice of the road due to the county commissioners’ failure to strictly comply
with Colorado’s recording statute.55 Therefore, when a subsequent purchaser with
no notice of a prior interest records in the correct place and manner before a prior
grantee records, that prior grantee must bear the loss.56
Conversely, one Wyoming Supreme Court case held that notice is not
required to bind a subsequent good faith purchaser when a road is created by
condemnation.57 In State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Meeker, the Board
of County Commissioners of Laramie County condemned Nell Fowler’s property
to construct a highway.58 Three years later, in 1953, construction on the highway
began.59 However, Stanley Meeker had purchased the property from Nell Fowler
in 1952.60 The State of Wyoming brought an action against Meeker enjoining
him from interfering with its right of way.61 Meeker claimed he had no actual
notice of the proposed highway, and neither he nor his title insurer had found a
recorded instrument establishing the highway in the county clerk’s office.62 The
trial court found in favor of Meeker.63

348 P.2d 63, 66 (Wyo. 1959); Bentley v. Dir. of Office of State Lands and Invs., 160 P.3d
1109, 1120 (Wyo. 2007).
52

In re Estate of Hite, 829 P.2d 1173, 1176 (Wyo. 1992) (holding an improperly recorded
judgment void against a subsequent purchaser when it appeared the clerk committed the error).
53

54

Lakewood v. Mavromatis, 817 P.2d 90, 98–99 (Colo. 1991).

Id. at 91, 93 (“[P]ublic highways can be created . . . without compliance with the recording
act but . . . such compliance is required to give constructive notice of public highway rights to
third persons.”).
55

56
Condos v. Trapp, 717 P.2d 827, 832 (Wyo. 1986) (noting that the prior grantee had the
opportunity to avoid the loss by recording his or her interest in a timely fashion).
57

See State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Meeker, 294 P.2d 603, 605–06 (Wyo. 1956).

58

Id. at 603.

59

Id. at 604.

60

Id.

61

Id. at 603.

62

Id. at 604.

63

Id.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol13/iss1/2
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On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed, holding eminent domain
was not a conveyance within the meaning of Wyoming’s recording statute.64 The
court noted that at the time Meeker purchased the property, no statute required
recordation of the transfer of title by eminent domain.65 Therefore, common
law governed the dispute.66 At common law, the first to acquire an interest in
property had a better right over those who subsequently gained an interest in that
property.67 The court reasoned under common law, the State’s title was superior
against Meeker because the State acquired the property through its condemnation
proceedings before Meeker acquired his right by conveyance.68
Importantly, even though the court held notice was not required, it
nonetheless observed that Meeker had constructive notice of the eminent domain
proceedings.69 The court stated, “Defendant Meeker was in possession of the land
in question as lessee during all of the time the eminent domain proceedings were
taking place and must have had notice thereof or at least he is presumed to have
had notice thereof.”70 The court noted that boards of county commissioners are
agents of the legislature, and that everyone is compelled to take notice of legislative
acts.71 Therefore, the court held that published minutes of commissioner meetings
are ample notice of eminent domain proceedings to subsequent purchasers.72

Wyoming’s Voluntary Comprehensive Road Identification Procedure
In 1987, the Wyoming Legislature created a mechanism by which counties
could comprehensively identify all county roads.73 Even though recording has
long been required in order to establish and to serve as notice of county roads,

64
Id. at 605; see Wyo. Comp. Stat. §§ 66-119, -124 (1945). Section 66-119 of the Wyoming
Compiled Statutes required every conveyance of real estate to be recorded in order to be valid
against a subsequent good faith purchaser. Section 66-124 of the Wyoming Compiled Statutes
defined “conveyance” as including “every instrument in writing by which any estate or interest
in real estate is created.” See also Meeker, 294 P.2d at 605. The Meeker court held that the transfer
of title by eminent domain was not a conveyance within the meaning of the statute because it
transferred title against the owner’s consent. Id.
65

Id.

66

Id.

Id. (citing 45 Am. Jur. Records and Recording Laws 435 (1943); 2 Merrill on Notice § 921
(1952)). The court relied on the maxim “prior in tempore potior est in jure,” meaning, “he who is
first in time has the better right.” Id.
67

68

Id.

69

Id. at 606.

70

Id.

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

1987 Wyo. Sess. Laws 99–100 (current version at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-3-201 (2012)).
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the comprehensive identification process is not mandatory.74 Nevertheless,
this legislation was in response to the existence of “inaccurate and inconsistent
records” of county roads.75 In describing the purpose of the procedure, the legisla
ture noted:
There exist roads which are seldom used, not maintained and are
not identified as or believed by the public to be county roads but
are, in fact, county roads. Recognizing the numerous difficulties
resulting from the existence of such county roads, the legislature
finds it in the best interest of the public to create a procedure
to identify county roads, thereby altering and vacating these
abandoned or unnecessary county roads without survey.76
This statement shows the legislative intent to aid counties and landowners by
clarifying which roads are county roads.77 Notably, however, this voluntary
procedure has not been implemented state-wide.78

Principal Case
In 1999, Edward and Janice King sought to purchase land in Fremont
County, Wyoming.79 Complying with standard procedure, the Kings employed a
title company, Fremont Title, to research the existence of any encumbrances on
the property’s title.80 The title search did not reveal the Bunker Road easement,
and the Kings purchased the property.81 However, unknown to the Kings or to
Fremont Title, the Commission had created Bunker Road across the property
eighty-six years earlier.82 In 1913, the Commission filed the field notes of the
survey of Bunker Road, as well as a preliminary plat map of the road, in a road
folder with the Fremont County Clerk.83 The Commission filed the official plat
map separately in a cabinet folder that was moved to the Fremont County Planning

74

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-3-201 (2012); see supra notes 28–71 and accompanying text.

75

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-3-201 (2012).

76

Id.

77

See id.

78

Interview with Alan Frank, supra note 10; Interview with M. Gregory Weisz, supra note 10.

King, 244 P.3d 473, 475 (Wyo. 2010). The Kings intended to create “King Estates
Subdivision.” Id. at 475; Brief for Appellant King at 8, King v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Fremont,
244 P.3d 473 (Wyo. 2010) (No. S-09-227), 2009 WL 5262888, at *7.
79

80

King, 244 P.3d at 475; Brief for Appellant King, supra note 79, at 8.

81

King, 244 P.3d at 475; Brief for Appellant King, supra note 79, at 8.

82

See King, 244 P.3d at 476–77.

King I, No. 34662, 2008 WL 7727322, at ¶ 2 (Wyo. Dist. Ct., 9th Jud. Dist., Fremont
Cnty. Apr. 22, 2008) (Order Denying Plaintiffs’ and Intervening Plaintiff ’s Motion for Summary
Judgment in Part and Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in Part).
83
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Office in the late 1970s, then to the Roads and Transportation Department, and
finally back to the County Clerk’s Office in 2005.84 The road was never indexed
in a manner that would give subsequent purchasers notice of its existence.85
In 1999, the records were housed in either the county planning office or the
county roads and transportation department.86 In researching title for the Kings,
Fremont Title would have had to “inquire[] of a county clerk employee about the
existence and actual location of the records pertaining to county roads” in order
to find the records of Bunker Road.87 Furthermore, it is unclear whether the road
was ever physically established.88 At the time of the Kings’ purchase, the only
evidence of the road was a two-track trail that was “difficult or even impossible
to find or even negotiate, except on foot.”89 The faint trail ran into and out of a
building, over a wellhead, and down the bed of Baldwin Creek.90 Therefore, the
Kings did not find Bunker Road in their title search and may not have seen any
physical evidence of the road on the ground.91
When the Kings finally learned about Bunker Road, they sought a ruling from
the Commission that the road had been vacated or abandoned.92 The Commission
denied the Kings’ request.93 Subsequently, the Kings filed an action in the District
Court of Fremont County against the Commission seeking a declaratory judgment
that the road had never been properly established, or that it had been vacated
or abandoned.94 Hansen’s North Fork Ranch (Hansen) intervened as a plaintiff
because it also owned land burdened by the Bunker Road easement.95 On partial
summary judgment, the district court found the Commission properly created
Bunker Road, despite uncertainty about whether the road was ever properly

84

Id. at ¶ 3.

85

King, 244 P.3d at 477.

86

Id. at 483.

87

Id.

King I, 2008 WL 7727322, at ¶ 9. The Wyoming Supreme Court noted that, at the
least, the road had been unused and unmaintained “for quite some time.” King, 244 P.3d at 473
(quoting Memorandum from Ray Price, Fremont County Director of Planning, to the Commission
(Apr. 24, 2002)).
88

King, 244 P.3d at 475 (quoting Fremont Country Director of Planning Ray Price, letter to
Jim Freeman, February 18, 2000).
89

90

Id. at 477; King I, 2008 WL 7727322, at ¶ 9; Interview with Steven F. Freudenthal, supra

note 10.
91

King, 244 P.3d at 475.

92

Id. at 474.

93

Id.

94

Id. at 473.

Id.; Brief for Appellant Hansen at 5, King v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Fremont, 244 P.3d
473 (Wyo. 2010) (No.S-09-0227), 2009 WL 5262887 at *3–4.
95
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recorded.96 However, two issues remained for trial: (1) whether the Kings and
Hansen had actual notice of Bunker Road, and (2) whether they were subsequent
purchasers in good faith of the property subject to the road easement.97 Under the
district court’s ruling, if the Kings and Hansen could prove at trial that they were
subsequent purchasers of their property without actual or constructive notice of
the Bunker Road easement, their interests would be protected under Wyoming’s
bona fide purchaser protections, and the portion of Bunker Road crossing their
land would be void.98 Nevertheless, the district court later dismissed the remainder
of the case relying on Meeker’s holding that condemnation proceedings need not
be recorded in order to be valid against subsequent good faith purchasers.99 On
appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed.100

Majority Opinion
First, the Wyoming Supreme Court considered the district court’s holding
that Bunker Road had been properly created in 1913.101 The court acknowledged
Bunker Road was not recorded in the grantor/grantee index in the Fremont
County clerk’s office.102 The court also agreed with the district court’s conclusion
that “the Wyoming Legislature . . . intended to require the recording of the Bunker
Road Petition in compliance with the Wyoming Recording Act.”103 The court,
however, citing the Colorado case, Mavromatis, for the proposition that a road
can be created despite non-compliance with a recording act, held that “there were
no genuine issues of material fact as to whether Bunker Road had been created in
the first instance.”104
Having determined that Bunker Road had been created in 1913, the
Wyoming Supreme Court next considered whether the Kings were entitled to
the bona fide purchaser protections in Wyoming’s “unrecorded conveyance”
statute.105 In doing so, the court first acknowledged the district court’s reliance on
Meeker.106 The district court dismissed the Kings’ case based on Meeker’s holding
96

King, 244 P.3d at 476.

97

Id.

98

See supra notes 41–56 and accompanying text.

King I, No. 34662, 2009 WL 6364902 (Wyo. Dist. Ct., 9th Jud. Dist., Fremont Cnty.
Sept. 11, 2009) (Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss). Bunker Road was created by
condemnation. Brief for Appellee Commissioners at 4–5, 7, King v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of
Fremont, 244 P.3d 473 (Wyo. 2010) (No. S-09-0227), 2010 WL 735525, at *4–7.
99

100

King, 244 P.3d at 489.

101

Id. at 476–77. The majority consisted of Justices Hill, Kite, and Golden. See id. at 474, 490.

102

Id. at 477.

103

Id.

104

Id.

105

Id. at 478–89.

106

Id. at 478–82.
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that, before 1953, the government was not required to comply with the recording
statute in order to secure its title against subsequent purchasers.107 Therefore,
the district court held that “the question of Plaintiffs’ status as subsequent bona
fide purchasers [was] moot” because the Commission’s interest was not subject
to recordation.108 The court then noted that Meeker and other cases interpreting
Wyoming’s recording and road creation statutes suggest that nothing short of
formal action on the part of the Commission could disestablish a county road.109
Therefore, the court held that even the lack of notice to a subsequent good faith
purchaser is insufficient to render a previously created county road invalid.110
The Wyoming Supreme Court next weighed the unrecorded conveyance
statute against those statutes dealing with the creation of county roads.111 The
court first noted section 3654 of the Wyoming Compiled Statutes, providing
that every unrecorded conveyance of real estate would be void against subsequent
purchasers in good faith who record first.112 The court next cited section 2514,
which provided that no county road could be vacated without the authority of the
county commissioners.113 The court also acknowledged section 2513, requiring
the Commission to record every necessary and important road, and providing
that no unrecorded roads would be public roads unless properly established as
such.114 After introducing this tension, the court noted simply, “The records of
Bunker Road were maintained in the manner mandated by these statutes.”115
Additionally, the court stated:
The existing statutes, as well as our cases interpreting them
over the years, track closely with common law principles that
have long played a key role in issues such as this. Two of the
most important of those are: “Once a road, always a road;”
and, where a road is created by a statutory procedure such as
that in play here, such a road cannot be abandoned, vacated, or
disestablished without there being clear action on the part of the
governmental entity that created the road to vacate, abandon, or
disestablish it.116
King I, No. 34662, 2009 WL 6364902 (Wyo. Dist. Ct., 9th Jud. Dist., Fremont Cnty.
Sept. 11, 2009) (Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss); see State ex rel. State Highway
Comm’n v. Meeker, 294 P.2d 603, 605 (Wyo. 1956).
107

108

King I, 2009 WL 6364902, at *1.

109

King, 244 P.3d at 489.

110

See id.

111

Id.at 482 (calling this tension “[t]he heart of the controversy”).

112

Id.

113

Id.

114

Id. at 483.

115

Id.

116

Id. at 489.
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Because the court found Bunker Road had been properly established and never
formally vacated, abandoned, or disestablished, the court held the road was “still a
county road as a matter of law,” despite the Kings’ lack of notice.117 Furthermore,
the court noted that the legislature’s voluntary procedure for comprehensively
identifying county roads was enacted to remedy this very tension.118 However, the
court explained that because the statutory procedure does not mandate counties
to act, the procedure was not determinative of the issues in King.119

Concurrence in Part and Dissent in Part
The dissenting Justices concurred with the court’s finding that Bunker Road
was duly established.120 They disagreed, however, with the district court’s dismissal
of the case based on Meeker.121 First, the dissent argued Meeker “detours from a
long line of Wyoming cases emphasizing that county road easements must be
placed on the public record.”122 Second, the dissent noted that applying Meeker
would mean landowners would not be able to rely on the quality of title as shown
in the public records.123 Instead, the dissent reasoned that “every conveyance of
land would have to be accompanied by a review of all proceedings of the county
commissioners back to 1890.”124
Finally, the dissent argued Meeker was factually and legally distinguishable.125
The dissent found Meeker factually distinguishable because Meeker possessed
the property as a lessee during the condemnation proceedings.126 Even though
the Meeker court held that notice was immaterial, it nevertheless considered that

117

Id. at 476.

118

Id. at 489; see Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-3-201 to -206 (2012).

119

King, 244 P.3d at 489.

Id. at 490 (Burke, J., dissenting). Justice Burke authored the concurrence in part and
dissent in part, joined by Justice Voigt. Id.
120

121

Id.

Id. (citing Yeager v. Forbes, 78 P.3d 241 (Wyo. 2003); Kern v. Deerwood Ranch, 528 P. 2d
910 (Wyo. 1974); Ruby v. Schuett, 360 P.2d 170 (Wyo. 1961); Rocky Mtn. Sheep Co. v. Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs of Carbon Cnty., 269 P.2d 314 (Wyo 1954); Nixon v. Edwards, 264 P.2d 287, 294
(Wyo. 1953); George W. Condon Co. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Natrona Cnty., 103 P.2d 401,
407 (Wyo. 1940)).
122

123

Id. (citing Grose v. Sauvageau, 942 P.2d 398, 403 (Wyo. 1997)).

Id. (quoting Brief for Appellant Hansen at 16, King v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Fremont,
244 P.3d 473 (Wyo. 2010) (No.S-09-0227), 2009 WL 5262887, at *15, which also noted, “With
the greatest respect to the important and critical functions performed by each board of county
commissioners, the inordinate cost and agonizing boredom of such an exercise is readily apparent.”).
124

125

Id. at 490–91.

126

Id.
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Meeker “must have had notice” of the condemnation proceedings.127 In King,
however, the Commission sought to establish Bunker Road eighty years before
the Kings purchased their property.128 Therefore, the dissent argued that the
Kings could not be charged with notice of the Commission’s proceedings.129 The
dissent found Meeker was legally distinguishable because of that court’s failure
to apply the correct statute.130 The Meeker court concluded that common law
governed because no statutes existed requiring recordation of roads created by
condemnation.131 However, the dissent argued that Chapter 112 of the Wyoming
Session Laws in 1919 replaced the common law and required recordation of all
roads, regardless of how the interest was acquired.132 The dissent would have
reversed and remanded the district court’s decision to determine whether the
Kings and Hansen had notice of the Bunker Road easement.133

Analysis
The King court was incorrect to affirm the district court’s decision.134 The
court improperly relied on Mavromatis to determine Bunker Road was properly
created.135 Furthermore, the court improperly relied on Meeker to dispose of
the remaining issues in the case.136 As a result, King leaves bona fide purchasers
vulnerable to unrecorded interests on their land.137 This analysis proposes the
Wyoming Legislature should reinstate protections for bona fide purchasers
and modify the existing road identification procedure in order to remedy the
uncertainty for rural landowners created by King.138

Improper Reliance on Mavromatis
In King, the material facts regarding the recording of Bunker Road were
undisputed.139 The Commission filed the survey in the county’s plat book, but

127
Id.; State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Meeker, 294 P.2d 603, 606 (Wyo. 1956). This
notice may have influenced the court’s decision.
128

See King, 244 P.3d at 476 (majority opinion).

129

Id. at 491 (Burke, J., dissenting).

130

Id.

131

Id.

132

Id.

133

Id. at 490–91.

134

See infra notes 140–223 and accompanying text.

135

See infra notes 144–65 and accompanying text.

136

See infra notes 166–94 and accompanying text.

137

See infra notes 195–204 and accompanying text.

138

See infra notes 205–23 and accompanying text.

139

King, 244 P.3d 473, 477 (Wyo. 2010).
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filed the official plat map in a folder kept in a cabinet.140 Further, the road was
never indexed in a manner that would allow subsequent purchasers to easily
ascertain its existence.141 Both parties agreed that a title examiner looking for
evidence of Bunker Road would not have had access to the records unless he
or she asked an employee of the county clerk’s office about the location of the
records.142 Therefore, the court decided the case as a matter of law.143 However,
the Wyoming Supreme court incorrectly relied on Mavromatis to hold as a matter
of law that a government entity need not comply with recording requirements
when creating a road.144 The court should have relied on Wyoming law and held
that the actions of the Commission were insufficient to satisfy the requirements
of Wyoming’s recording laws.145
Wyoming statutes require recording in order to create a road.146 The same
was true when the Commission set out to establish Bunker Road in 1913.147
Specifically, section 2531 of the 1910 Wyoming Compiled Statutes required the
Commission to record a survey and plat of the road with the county clerk.148
Moreover, only six years after Bunker Road’s establishment, Chapter 112 of the
1919 Wyoming Session Laws required the recordation of all roads if “necessary
or important for the public use as [a] permanent road[].”149 Importantly, the law
provided that after the amended deadline of January 1, 1924, no unrecorded road
would continue to exist as a public road.150
Moreover, courts have found Wyoming statutes clear in requiring recording
to create a county road.151 The court in George W. Condon Co. v. Board of County

King I, No. 34662, 2008 WL 7727322, at ¶ 2, 3 (Wyo. Dist. Ct., 9th Jud. Dist., Fremont
Cnty. Apr. 22, 2008) (Order Denying Plaintiffs’ and Intervening Plaintiff ’s Motion for Summary
Judgment in Part and Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in Part).
140

141

Id.

142

Id.

See Wyo. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (2012). The rule states that if there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
143

See King, 244 P.3d 473, 477 (Wyo. 2010) (discussing the Mavromatis case); infra notes
147–64 and accompanying text.
144

See, e.g., George W. Condon Co. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Natrona Cnty., 103 P.2d 401,
407 (Wyo. 1940) (noting an unrecorded road was not a county road, and therefore it was improper
for the county to construct or maintain the road); infra notes 147–64 and accompanying text.
145

146

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-1-101 (2012); see supra notes 21–35 and accompanying text.

147

Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 2531 (1910).

148

Id.

149

See 1919 Wyo. Sess. Laws 114.

150

Id. (amended by 1921 Wyo. Sess. Laws 139); Yeager v. Forbes, 78 P.3d 241, 255 (Wyo. 2003).

See, e.g., Kern v. Deerwood Ranch, 528 P.2d 910, 911–12 (Wyo. 1974) (holding that
defendants failed in their burden to prove the existence of a county road because they could not show
the road survey and plat were filed with the county clerk); supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text.
151
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Commissioners of Natrona County held that an unrecorded road was not a county
road.152 In Ruby v. Shuett, the establishment of a county road failed because the
survey recorded was not sufficiently clear.153 Similarly, in Kern v. Deerwood Ranch,
the Wyoming Supreme Court found that a county road did not exist because it
could not be shown that the road had been recorded.154
The central issue regarding Bunker Road’s creation, then, is whether the
acts of the Commission were sufficient to affect proper recording of the road.
Section 2531 required the Commission to plat the road survey and plat map in
books provided by the county clerk so the road could be easily ascertained.155
The Commission filed the survey in the county clerk’s plat book, but placed the
official plat map in a folder kept in a cabinet.156 The court has previously held
that such recording errors render the recording invalid against subsequent good
faith purchasers.157 Additionally, by relying on Mavromatis to hold that a failure
to record would not defeat a road’s establishment, the King court itself implied
that the Commission failed to record.158 Accordingly, the failure to record Bunker
Road should have defeated its establishment, and furthermore rendered it vacated
after 1924.159 Therefore, the Wyoming Supreme Court improperly upheld the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Commission on the issue of
Bunker Road’s creation.160

Improper Reliance on Meeker
Next, the Wyoming Supreme Court incorrectly affirmed the district court’s
dismissal of the remaining issues in the King case based on Meeker.161 The
application of Meeker is incorrect for two reasons. First, Meeker departs from

152

103 P.2d 401, 407 (Wyo. 1940).

153

360 P.2d 170, 174 (Wyo. 1961).

154

528 P.2d at 911–12.

155

Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 2531 (1910).

King I, No. 34662, 2008 WL 7727322, at ¶ 2, 3 (Wyo. Dist. Ct., 9th Jud. Dist., Fremont
Cnty. Apr. 22, 2008) (Order Denying Plaintiffs’ and Intervening Plaintiff ’s Motion for Summary
Judgment in Part and Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in Part).
156

157
In re Estate of Hite, 829 P.2d 1173, 1176 (Wyo. 1992); Ruby v. Shuett, 360 P.2d 170, 174
(Wyo. 1961); see supra notes 41–72 and accompanying text.
158

See King, 244 P.3d 473, 477 (Wyo. 2010).

159

See Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 2531 (1910); 1919 Wyo. Sess. Laws 114.

Compare Kern v. Deerwood Ranch, 528 P.2d 910, 911–12 (Wyo. 1974) (holding that
defendants failed in their burden to prove the existence of a county road because they could not
show the road survey and plat were filed with the county clerk, i.e., because the road was recorded
incorrectly), with King, 244 P.3d 473, 477 (Wyo. 2010) (holding that a road can be created despite
non-compliance with a recording act). See supra notes 146–60 and accompanying text.
160

161
King, 244 P.3d 473, 490 (Wyo. 2010) (Burke, J., dissenting); see infra notes 162–91 and
accompanying text.
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established Wyoming law requiring recording to act as notice for subsequent
purchasers.162 Second, Meeker is factually distinguishable from King.163 Therefore,
the court erred in relying on Meeker to dismiss the case.164
Meeker departs from established Wyoming law requiring recording in order
for an interest to be valid against a subsequent good faith purchaser.165 The Meeker
court determined that before 1953, no Wyoming statute required recording of
an interest acquired by condemnation.166 The court reasoned that in the absence
of a statute, the common law rule of “first in time, first in right” applied to
land interests.167 Therefore, a governmental entity’s interest in land acquired by
condemnation would be valid, even against a subsequent purchaser who had
no notice of the prior interest.168 However, the Meeker court disregarded at least
one statute that required recording of an interest acquired by condemnation.169
Chapter 112 of the 1919 Wyoming Session Laws required all necessary roads—
regardless of the method of their creation—to be recorded in order to be valid.170
Therefore, the Meeker court incorrectly determined that the common law of “first
in time, first in right” should apply. This same statute should have applied in
King, requiring the recordation of Bunker Road by January 1, 1924 in order for
it to remain a valid road.171 Furthermore, in relying on Meeker, the King court
disregarded an additional statute—section 2531 of the 1910 Wyoming Compiled
Statutes—requiring the recordation of any road.172
Moreover, as noted by the dissent, Meeker ignores a long line of cases holding
that recording is required for county road easements, regardless of how they are
acquired.173 In George W. Condon Co. v. Board of County Commissioners of Natrona
162

King, 244 P.3d at 490 (Burke, J., dissenting); see infra notes 165–76 and accompanying text.

163

King, 244 P.3d at 491 (Burke, J., dissenting); see infra notes 177–89 and accompanying text.

King, 244 P.3d at 490–91 (Burke, J., dissenting); see infra notes 165–91 and accompanying text.
164

165

King, 244 P.3d at 490 (Burke, J., dissenting); see infra notes 166–76 and accompanying text.

166

State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Meeker, 294 P.2d 603, 605 (Wyo. 1956).

167

Id.

168

Id. at 605–06.

Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 2531 (1910); 1919 Wyo. Sess. Laws 114; see King, 244 P.3d at 491
(Burke, J., dissenting) (finding “at least one statute requiring the Bunker Road easement to
be recorded.”).
169

1919 Wyo. Sess. Laws 114. (“It shall be the duty of the several Boards of County
Commissioners . . . to determine what if any such roads . . . are necessary or important for the public
use as permanent roads, and to cause such roads to be recorded.” (emphasis added)).
170

171

King, 244 P.3d at 482 (majority opinion).

Id.; Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 2531 (1910) (“If . . . the board of county commissioners shall
decide to lay out or alter any road, they shall . . . plat the same in books to be provided by the county
for such purpose.” (emphasis added)).
172

173
King, 244 P.3d at 490 (Burke, J., dissenting) (citing Yeager v. Forbes, 78 P.3d 241 (Wyo.
2003); Kern v. Deerwood Ranch, 528 P. 2d 910 (Wyo. 1974); Ruby v. Schuett, 360 P.2d 170
(Wyo. 1961); Rocky Mtn. Sheep Co. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Carbon Cnty., 269 P.2d 314
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County, the court noted that Wyoming’s recording statute “indicates a policy
that roads should be shown on the records.”174 In Nixon v. Edwards, the court
noted the legislative history of recording statutes demonstrates “how thoroughly
the legislature was convinced that all rural public roads should be shown on the
public records.”175 In short, “the Wyoming Legislature and [Wyoming Supreme]
Court have consistently, with the exception of Meeker, said that county roads
must be placed on the public record.”176
Furthermore, as discussed by the dissent, Meeker is factually distinguishable
from King.177 Initially, the condition of the road distinguishes Meeker from
King.178 The road involved in Meeker was “commenced and substantially . . .
completed” by the time of trial.179 In contrast, when the Kings purchased their
property, Bunker Road was barely recognizable as a road.180 The district court
noted it was unclear if the road had ever been physically established.181 Regardless,
in 1999, Bunker Road had “not been used by the general public or maintained
by Fremont County for quite some time.”182 It ran under existing structures and
into a creek bed.183 Furthermore, the degree of notice supplied by the condition
of the roads distinguishes Meeker.184 Meeker likely had actual notice of the road
being built across his property.185 On the contrary, the Kings likely had no actual
notice of Bunker Road.186 Additionally, Meeker had constructive notice of the
condemnation proceedings involving his land because he possessed the property

(Wyo 1954); Nixon v. Edwards, 264 P.2d 287, 294 (Wyo. 1953); George W. Condon Co. v. Bd.
of Cnty. Comm’rs of Natrona Cnty., 103 P.2d 401, 407 (Wyo. 1940)); see supra notes 30–35 and
accompanying text.
174

103 P.2d 401, 407 (Wyo. 1940).

175

264 P.2d 287, 294 (Wyo. 1953) (emphasis added).

176

King, 244 P.3d at 491 (Burke, J., dissenting).

177

Id. at 490–91; see infra notes 178–89 and accompanying text.

178

King, 244 P.3d at 491 (Burke, J., dissenting).

179

Id.; State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Meeker, 294 P.2d 603, 604 (Wyo. 1956).

King I, No. 34662, 2008 WL 7727322, at ¶ 9 (Wyo. Dist. Ct., 9th Jud. Dist., Fremont
Cnty. Apr. 22, 2008) (Order Denying Plaintiff ’s and Intervening Plaintiff ’s Motion for Summary
Judgment in Part and Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in Part); Interview
with Steven F. Freudenthal, supra note 10.
180

181

King I, 2008 WL 7727322, at ¶ 9.

182

King, 244 P.3d at 475 (majority opinion).

183

King I, 2008 WL 7727322, at ¶ 9; Interview with Steven F. Freudenthal, supra note 10.

See King, 244 P.3d at 491 (Burke, J., dissenting) (discussing the differences between the
Bunker Road and the road in Meeker); infra notes 185–89 and accompanying text.
184
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See State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Meeker, 294 P.2d 603, 604 (Wyo. 1956).

See King, 244 P.3d at 491 (Burke, J., dissenting) (finding a lack of constructive notice
with Bunker Road, particularly when contrasted with the facts of Meeker); supra notes 79–91 and
accompanying text.
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as a lessee during the proceedings.187 In contrast, the Kings did not possess the
land in question when the Commission established Bunker Road in 1913.188 In
order for the Commissioner’s minutes to serve as constructive notice, the title
examiner would have had to search over eighty years of board minutes.189

King Leaves Rural Landowners Vulnerable to Unrecorded Encumbrances
Not only is the King court’s decision legally unfounded, it also results in poor
policy.190 King leaves rural landowners “naked to undisclosed county roads.”191 As
a result, even if a diligent purchaser searched public records, he or she could be
burdened by unrecorded encumbrances.192 Like the Kings, other rural landowners
now have uncertainty in the quality of their title, even after acquiring a title
opinion from an attorney or a title company.193 After King, the only way for a
purchaser to know conclusively whether his or her land is burdened by a county
road is to review all county records in all county offices.194 The time and effort
required for such a search is a substantial and impractical burden on a prospective
purchaser.195 This burden creates risk that could limit private investment in
land.196 Additionally, title insurers will likely exempt county roads from coverage
or will redefine narrowly the term “public records” against which they will
insure.197 Therefore, the burden of liability for undisclosed encumbrances will

Meeker, 294 P.2d at 606. Meeker’s actual knowledge of the proceedings may explain the
court’s holding the minutes of commissioner meetings sufficient for notice. See id.
187

188

King, 244 P.3d at 491 (Burke, J., dissenting).

189

See id. at 490–91.

See, e.g., Interview with Steven F. Freudenthal, supra note 10 (noting that attorneys “cannot
give clients any certainty” regarding county roads on their property); infra notes 10, 193–201 and
accompanying text.
190

191

Interview with Steven F. Freudenthal, supra note 10.

Telephone Interview with Keith Dodson, supra note 10; Interview with M. Gregory Weisz,
supra note 10.
192

193
Appellant King’s Petition for Rehearing at 18, King v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Fremont,
244 P.3d 473 (Wyo. 2010) (No. S-09-0227).
194

Interview with M. Gregory Weisz, supra note 10.

Id.; Brief for Appellant Hansen at 16 n.2, King v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Fremont, 244
P.3d 473 (Wyo. 2010) (No. S-09-0227), 2009 WL 5262887, at *15 n.2 (citing the “inordinate cost
and agonizing boredom of such an exercise”).
195

See Frank S. Alexander, Louisiana Land Reform in the Storms’ Aftermath, 53 Loy. L. Rev.
727, 734 (2006) (commenting that the structure of land policies can discourage private investment
in land); Michael B. Kent, Forming a Tie that Binds: Development Agreements in Georgia and the Need
for Legislative Clarity, 30 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol’y J. 1, 32 (2006) (noting that uncertainty in
future land rights discourages investment); Joyce Palomar, Contributions Legal Scholars Can Make to
Development Economics: Examples from China, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1011, 1035 (2004) (arguing
that insecurity in land rights can inhibit investment in land).
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Interview with M. Gregory Weisz, supra note 10; Interview with Steven F. Freudenthal,
supra note 10; Telephone Interview with Keith Dodson, supra note 10.
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shift from title insurers to landowners.198 As a result, attorneys are left without a
clear standard with which to advise rural clients, since they cannot provide their
clients with certainty about the condition of their title.199

Legislative Solutions
Counties presently have an incentive to implement the voluntary road
identification procedure because any disputes that arise during the process would
be decided in the counties’ favor under King.200 These decisions, however, would
come at the expense of rural landowners who have no notice of county roads
crossing their property. 201 There are two legislative solutions to remedy King.202
First, bona fide purchaser protections must be reinstated to ensure no other rural
landowners are faced with this situation.203 Second, it is critical for the legislature
to make the process mandatory in order to afford proper notice to landowners
across the state and to create certainty of title for both counties and landowners.204
Wyoming’s current recording statute protects good faith purchasers who
record first.205 However, the Wyoming Supreme Court in King effectively
abrogated these statutory protections by making them inapplicable to county
roads.206 The legislature should reinstate good faith purchaser protections by
passing legislation specifically subjecting county roads to Wyoming’s unrecorded
conveyance statute.207 This modified statute would supersede King, restoring
the protections afforded to those who diligently search real property records for
the existence of county roads.208 Without this first step, King’s precedent gives

198

Telephone Interview with Keith Dodson, supra note 10.

199

Id.; Interview with M. Gregory Weisz, supra note 10.

Baessler v. Freier, 258 P.3d 720, 725 (Wyo. 2011) (quoting Alpine Lumber Co. v. Capital
W. Nat’l Bank, 231 P.3d 869, 872 (Wyo. 2010)) (explaining that “a court must follow earlier judicial
decisions when the same points arise again in litigation”); Hannifan v. Am. Nat’l Bank of Cheyenne,
185 P.3d 629, 695 (Wyo. 2008) (Voigt, J., concurring).
200

201

See supra notes 41–56, 83–102 and accompanying text.

202

See infra notes 203–13 and accompanying text.

203

See infra notes 205–09 and accompanying text.

Interview with M. Gregory Weisz, supra note 10; Telephone Interview with Keith Dodson,
supra note 10.
204

205

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-120 (2012); see supra notes 41–56 and accompanying text.

See King, 244 P.3d 473, 491 (Wyo. 2010) (Burke, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority
should have remanded the action to determine if the Kings were bona fide purchasers without
notice); supra notes 103–19 and accompanying text.
206

See Torgeson v. Connelly, 348 P.2d 63, 67 (Wyo. 1959) (noting that complaints regarding
recording statutes are properly solved by the legislature).
207

See Kirby Bldg. Sys. v. Mineral Explorations Co., 704 P.2d 1266, 1277–78 (Wyo. 1985)
(noting that legislation is appropriate to cure inequities created by case law); Pac. Power & Light v.
Parsons, 692 P.2d 810, 814 (Wash. 1984).
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counties the advantage in all road disputes, even where a subsequent purchaser
has no actual or constructive notice of the road.209
Second, the Wyoming Legislature should amend the existing voluntary
road identification procedure to make it mandatory.210 Although the legislature
intended the procedure to aid counties and landowners by clarifying which roads
are county roads, the voluntary nature of the statute will not meet that goal.211 If
counties are not required to implement the requirements of the statute, there is
no guarantee that “inaccurate and inconsistent records” of county roads will be
cured.212 The current statute states, “When it finds the public interest so requires,
the board may initiate the identification procedure under this act.”213 A revised
statute would instruct that the board must initiate the identification procedure by
a specified date.
Implementing this comprehensive road identification procedure will likely
require a significant investment from counties.214 Furthermore, renewing protec
tions for bona fide purchasers will eliminate counties’ incentive to make that
investment voluntarily because landowners without notice of an unrecorded
county road could successfully challenge its validity.215 However, some counties,
aided by Geographic Information Services (GIS) systems, have already identified
and mapped a comprehensive collection of county roads.216 This information,
already possessed by counties, will mitigate the cost of implementing a modified
section 24-3-201 by fulfilling the procedure’s requirement of mapping each
county road.217

See King, 244 P.3d 473, 491 (Wyo. 2010) (Burke, J., dissenting) (highlighting the
requirement and failure of the county to record Bunker Road and the majority’s misplaced reliance
on Meeker); supra notes 42–56 and accompanying text.
209

Interview with M. Gregory Weisz, supra note 10; Interview with Alan Frank, supra note 10;
Telephone Interview with Keith Dodson, supra note 10.
210

Telephone Interview with Keith Dodson, supra note 10; Interview with M. Gregory Weisz,
supra note 10.
211

212
Telephone Interview with Keith Dodson, supra note 10; Interview with M. Gregory Weisz,
supra note 10.
213

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-3-203 (2012) (emphasis added).

Interview with Alan Frank, supra note 10 (citing the cost of new surveys as one prominent concern).
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Telephone Interview with Keith Dodson, supra note 10; Interview with M. Gregory Weisz,
supra note 10; Interview with Alan Frank, supra note 10.
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Interview with M. Gregory Weisz, supra note 10; Interview with Alan Frank, supra note 10.

Interview with M. Gregory Weisz, supra note 10; Interview with Alan Frank, supra note
10; see Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-3-203 (2012) (requiring a resolution referencing maps of all county
roads in the area). To further alleviate counties’ cost concerns, the legislature could expressly allow
counties to use surveys they already possess rather than obtaining a new one for each recorded road.
Interview with Alan Frank, supra note 10; see supra note 214 and accompanying text.
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A mandatory comprehensive identification procedure reflects the policy
inherent in Wyoming’s legislative history requiring the recordation of county roads
in order to afford effective notice.218 Furthermore, mandatory implementation
benefits all stakeholders—rural landowners, counties, the public, and the courts.219
Rural landowners will be able to rely on the quality of title found in the county
records.220 Counties will know better how to allocate their limited resources
for maintaining roads.221 The public may benefit from increased maintenance
of newly discovered county roads.222 Finally, after this proposed procedure is
completed, litigation stemming from the uncertainty of title due to unrecorded
county roads is likely to decrease.223

Conclusion
The result of King is that bona fide purchasers in Wyoming have lost the
protections previously afforded by Wyoming’s recording statute and case law.224
The King court incorrectly relied on Colorado case law, while ignoring generations
of Wyoming case law, to conclude that Bunker Road was properly created.225
Furthermore, the King court incorrectly relied on Meeker to dismiss the remaining
issues in the case.226 Wyoming’s legislature should remedy the present uncertainty
created by King.227 First, the legislature should reinstate protections for bona fide
purchasers who diligently search real property records.228 Second, the legislature
should make mandatory the existing procedure to comprehensively identify all
county roads.229 These reforms would benefit rural landowners, counties, the
public, and the courts while honoring the continuity of public roads.230

218
See, e.g., Nixon v. Edwards, 264 P.2d 287, 291 (Wyo. 1953) (“[C]ommencing with at
least the legislative act of 1886, . . . the legislature adopted a general policy under which . . . all
rural public thoroughfares thereafter established should be shown on the records of the public
authorities.”); supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.
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